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. However, little is known about the impact on the consumption-portfolio policies and equilibrium of another type of constraints which impinges on the intertemporal allocation of risks of most investors in nancial markets, namely liquidity constraints. These constraints introduce a form of market incompleteness which is markedly di erent from the situation created by the type of portfolio constraints considered in the literature so far.
A liquidity constraint arises as a result of the restriction to borrow against one's future income. Labor income is a typical example of an endowment stream that, in general, cannot be marketed due to moral hazard reasons or due to observability but non-veri ability of the idiosyncratic payment stream. However, unlike previous attempts which capture this situation by i n troducing ad-hoc limits on short-sales for speci c assets for example, Constantinides et. al 1997, Basak and Cuoco 1997, we only constrain the value of the marketable assets of an individual to be nonnegative at all times. This is equivalent to the requirement that any short position has to be fully collateralized with marketable assets. While this constraint is automatically satis ed by placing a nonnegativity constraint on consumption when the endowment consists exclusively of an initial lump-sum of money, it is not satis ed when income is received throughout lifetime. Thus, unlike the complete markets case, whenever there are liquidity constraints the timing of labor income payments matters for consumption and portfolio choice.
Early results on the impact of similar wealth constraints on the consumption-portfolio problem were provided by Scheinkman and Weiss 1986, He and Pages 1991 and Hindy 1995. In independent work, a control problem similar to ours is posed as a stopping time problem in El Karoui and Jeanblanc-Picque 1997. Also, the consumption-portfolio problem studied in the macroeconomics literature on bu er-stock" models arising from Deaton 1991, can beobtained as a special case of our formulation when agents are only allowed to trade a riskless asset. However, the nature and properties of the solution, characterized by the path-dependency of the consumption and portfolio choices, have not been identi ed in previous work. In addition, the analysis of the impact of liquidity constraints on equilibrium prices and allocations has not been considered in the literature either.
Our liquidity constraint formulation can berationalized as follows: imagine an economy in which an agent can default at any time. Suppose that there is a costless technology available that tracks the credit history of individuals a credit bureau. In addition, purchases and sales are anonymous but short sales are not. Short-sales can becollateralized but, for moral hazard reasons, only traded assets are acceptable as collateral thus, an agent cannot pledge his future labor income as collateral. If an agent defaults i.e. walks away from any short position in any traded asset, he is not be able to borrow set up a short position thereafter any more. 1 Lastly, suppose also that all agents have a nite lifetime horizon T. Now, if an agent is short 1 This is di erent from the analysis in Kehoe and Levine 1993 and Alvarez and Jermann 1997, in which i f a n agent defaults, he is thereafter not allowed to take both long and short positions in asset markets. In our framework, long positions cannot be prevented after default because trade in asset markets is anonymous.
in some asset at T-1, he will simply not settle his short position at period T i.e. default is optimal at T. Thus, nobodywould bewilling to let him take a short position on any asset at T-1 unless he pledges enough collateral to cover this short position. At T-2, the agent knows that he will not be able to set up an uncollateralized short position at T-1 and therefore has no incentive to protect his credit history: he will optimally default at T-1 on any uncollateralized short position established at T-2. But anticipating that, other agents will then not allow him to establish an uncollateralized short position at T-2. By induction this argument holds at all times. As a result, any short position taken at any time must befully collateralized with marketable assets, or equivalently liquid wealth must be nonnegative at all times where by liquid wealth we understand the net value of the portfolio of traded assets of an individual.
More generally all cash ows that are under some form of control by agents enjoy limited marketability and are naturally subject to liquidity constraints. Thus, future in ows of idiosyncratic income cannot be part of liquid wealth until they are e ectively cashed. Liquidity constraints will thus restrict the ability of agents to smoothe their consumption pro le by placing a lower bound on the value of their liquid wealth. This form of constraint is then substantially distinct from incomplete markets or portfolio constraints examined in the earlier literature.
In this paper we solve the consumption-portfolio problem and derive equilibrium prices in the presence of liquidity constraints. Our approach to the consumption-portfolio problem is constructive. We rst show that the problem can be approached by introducing a suitable correction to state prices which solves a forward-backward inequality, and then we provide a characterization of the solution in terms of a purely backward inequality. This reformulation is of interest since i the existence of a solution to the backward inequality can be demonstrated and ii the backward inequality lends itself easily to numerical computations. The consumption policy is then obtained in closed form in terms of the corrected state price density.
Our continuous time formulation of the problem has advantages that go beyond mathematical convenience. In a discrete time economy in which asset prices have unbounded support, agents could never take short positions in risky assets since the constraint has to be met at all times with probability one. This is overly restrictive since it prevents even the very wealthy individuals from engaging in any short-selling activity at all times. Such pathologies are avoided in a continuous time framework because liquid wealth is a continuous process. The liquidity constraint is thus truly endogenized in the sense that individuals are free to choose any portfolio they wish as long as they remain solvent. Thus, no ad-hoc constraints on portfolio choices are required to model non-traded labor income.
Consumption behavior in the presence of a liquidity constraint has a priori surprising and economically interesting properties. The analysis of the control problem shows that the liquidity constraint is in fact a direct constraint on the consumption pro le of an individual as opposed to a constraint on his her portfolio policy. The implications for equilibrium are therefore radically di erent from those of models with portfolio constraints. This constraint induces an individual to shift consumption from the present to the future, uniformly across states of nature. Thus, consumption is deferred in early age while the agent builds up his liquid wealth. At later stages of the lifecycle, the individual compensates by consuming more than in the standard frictionless model with identical nancial market. The deferral of consumption in early age ensures that the liquidity constraint can be met at all subsequent times. The pattern of consumption deferral also exhibits interesting and albeit counterintuitive properties. The liquidity constraint is more likely to be binding when the individual experiences positive income shocks. At these times, the individual wishes to transfer resources to less favorable states of nature and thereby run liquidity de cits. Since the constraint precludes this it induces an increase in consumption. Furthermore since the marginal utility o f accumulated wealth is lowered along all possible future trajectories of the economy this increase in consumption is permanent. Successive occurrences of a binding liquidity constraint will be accompanied by successive permanent increases in consumption. This re ects the fact that the liquidity constraint induces a segmentation of the state space that prevents the agent from equalizing marginal utilities to state-price ratios uniformly across states of nature.
We show that one can characterize equilibrium prices in our economy through a representative agent formulation even though the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto Optimal. With this characterization, we show that the equity premium satis es the standard consumption CAPM. However, the liquidity constraint plays a role in the determination of expected returns since it a ects the relative risk aversion parameter of the aggregator in the economy, which is a composite of the agents' risk aversions and depends on the distribution of consumption across agents. Since constrained individuals defer consumption in the early stages of life, the distribution of consumption is shifted toward unconstrained agents. The Sharpe ratio of the stock market unambiguously increases whenever aggregate risk aversion is a decreasing function of the consumption share of constrained individuals. We provide simple conditions under which this holds. Liquidity constraints, however, are unable to rationalize the empirical magnitude of the Sharpe ratio.
The cumulative equilibrium interest return bears the full direct impact of the constraint, while the risk premium of the stock re ects the constraint through the consumption allocation. In equilibrium, the cumulative i n terest return has two components. The rst is a locally riskless interest rate r which has the familiar structure: it is positively related to the expected consumption growth rate and negatively related to the aggregate consumption risk if the aggregator exhibits positive prudence. The second is a nonincreasing, singular component A which is tied to the occurrence of a binding liquidity constraint. As mentioned above, whenever the constraint binds on an agent, his consumption demand experiences a permanent increase. Since the agent is prevented from borrowing, but not lending, at that time, the equilibrium interest rate must be lower than it would otherwise be. The yield to maturity o n a n y short term bond will then have a tendency to decrease relative to an unconstrained economy. 2 Accounting for liquidity constraints in asset pricing models may then help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle Weil 1990.
Liquidity constraints have a similar impact on equilibrium when the basic market structure is incomplete. In such a n e n vironment the liquidity constraint reduces the riskless return and fails to impact the structure of the Sharpe ratio. Market incompleteness also has a direct e ect on the riskless return but none on the structure of the Sharpe ratio. In economies populated by individuals with homogeneous constant relative risk aversion market incompleteness reinforces the e ect of liquidity constraints and further reduces the riskless return. However, neither incompleteness nor liquidity constraints can be invoked to explain the magnitude of the Sharpe ratio.
The next section of the paper provides an intuitive example to motivate the relevance of liquidity constraints. Section 2 details the structure of the economy. Section 3 solves the consumptionportfolio problem in the presence of a liquidity constraint; the economic behavior of optimal consumption is analyzed and further intuitions are provided in the context of the example developed in the introduction. In section 4 we develop a constructive approach to the determination of equilibrium and investigate the properties of the interest rate and the equity premium. Section 5 extends some results to incomplete markets. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
An example.
To illustrate the nature of the constraints that we investigate in this paper, we rst solve an example for the consumption-portfolio problem of an unconstrained agent in a standard completemarkets framework. Consider the binomial" tree economy with one stock and one bond and an investor with power preferences and a risk aversion coe cient equal to 3. The investor is endowed only with a stream of labor income. The following lattice describes the evolution of the stock 2 This holds if there is no o setting e ect due to a redistribution of consumption a ecting the risk aversion of the aggregator. Constant and homogeneous relative risk aversion across agents is a su cient condition for the unambiguous decrease in short term interest rates. price which is denoted by S, the endowment of the agent denoted by e, and the state-price density denoted by : Recall that the process makes t S t a martingale. Each time step in the lattice corresponds to one year. The implicit continuously-compounded interest rate is constant and equal to 5 per year. The probability of an up-movement in the lattice is constant and equal The continuous-time limit of this economy corresponds to a di usion economy with lognormally distributed stock returns with Sharpe ratio equal to 0:3, and a continuously compounded interest rate of 5. The individual has a labor income stream whose expected growth rate is higher when he is young: the expected growth rate is 10 in period zero, and 2:45 on average in period one. In addition, the standard deviation of labor income is 30 in period zero, 37 in period one in the up-state and 23 in period one in the down-state.
In this economy, the investor attempts to maximize his lifetime utility of consumption
by c hoosing a nonnegative consumption process c and a trading strategy that speci es the number of shares of the stock to hold and the number of one-period, $1 face value zero-coupon bonds to hold B at each node in the tree. The trading strategy is constrained to be self-nancing in that t+1 S t + B t+1 = t S t + B t exp r + e t , c t 2 for t = 0 ; 1 with 0 = B 0 = 0 : Since markets are complete and by standard arguments, rather than choosing c, and B that maximize 1 subject to 2, the agent can solve the consumption-portfolio choice problem just by choosing the consumption process c that maximizes 1 subject to the single budget constraint:
The nancing portfolio can then beobtained by recursive computation along the tree given the optimal consumption process. The following tree shows the evolution of optimal consumption c, optimal stock and bond holdings at the end of each period, after retrade and B respectively and the agent's wealth at the beginning of each period X. The Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint 3 is 0:5784: The portfolio of securities serves to nance future consumption in excess of the endowment net consumption. At nodes u and uu, the portfolio at the beginning of the period has a negative value: the agent is borrowing against his future labor income. For example, at the beginning of the third period at node uu, the individual owes 1:0836; which is the value at the beginning of the third period of the portfolio that was chosen at the end of the second period. In the standard, default-free Arrow-Debreu setting, he would settle this debt at the end of the third period using the excess of his endowment 2 : 5495 over his consumption 1:4659 at that node.
Note, however, that the above program presumes that the individual never defaults on his debt.
But, if income at node uu cannot be fully appropriated by a n y creditor, the individual would prefer to default and consume 2:5495 rather than settle his short position and only consume 1:4659. As a result his labor income will not be accepted as collateral by a n y one who might consider taking the opposite side of his short portfolio position. It is then not possible for the individual to enter node uu with negative liquidity in the rst place, i.e. the anticipation of possible rational default precludes negative portfolio values. The same reasoning applies at prior nodes of the tree, in particular at node u in period 2. Thus, we w ould like to solve the consumption-portfolio choice problem when liquid wealth X is constrained to be nonnegative at all times. In other words we want to constrain the individual not to dispose of his labor income until it is cashed. This is in sharp contrast to the standard complete markets solution in which the individual is able to sell his lifetime labor income up-front if he wishes to do so. In section 3 we develop the solution procedure in the presence of such a liquidity constraint; we revert to the numerical example above in section 3.5.
The economy.
We consider an intertemporal economy with nite horizon 0; T and two t ypes of agents described below. The uncertainty is represented by a complete probability space ; F, a probability measure P, a unidimensional Wiener process W de ned on ; F and a ltration F . We assume that F is the natural ltration generated by W and take F T = F:
Financial markets.
A stock and a riskless asset are traded in nancial markets none of the results of this paper depends on the existence of a single stock. There is no outside supply of this asset, and there is only one share of the stock outstanding. The value of a money market account, or a dollar continuously reinvested at the riskless spot interest rate, is 1=b t . Taking the di erence between the expected gross returns on the stock and the riskless asset and dividing by the stock price volatility gives the market price of risk = ,1 , r. Though our economy presents incompleteness due to liquidity constraints, a unique equilibrium state price density will still exist. 3 We will therefore maintain the following standard assumption which will enable us to solve the agents' consumption-portfolio problems. 
Agents.
The consumption space is the set of nonnegative, progressively measurable processes which satisfy the integrability condition, The market structure 4-6 is consistent with the absence of arbitrage opportunities see Karatzas, Lehoczky and Shreve 1991. An interpretation of the equilibrium state price density as the marginal utility of a representative agent i n a P areto-ine cient constrained equilibrium will be given below. Individuals are divided into two categories depending on whether their income stream can be marketed or not. Recall that by marketing" the labor income stream we mean using the future idiosyncratic income as collateral for today's aggregate short position. The set of all agents is I = C U where C is the set of constrained agents agents of type 1 and U is the set of unconstrained agents type 2. An example of an agent o f t ype U is an individual who inherits a claim to an exogenous production process say, a rm; a typical individual of type C is someone who only has a claim towards the income produced by his e ort. The income of constrained agents C must be either consumed or invested in marketed assets as it is obtained. Unconstrained agents can trade the stock and the riskless asset without restriction: markets are dynamically complete from their point of view. We naturally assume C U = ;: Let A i be the admissible set for i 2 C U. Condition 11 states that a liquidity-constrained individual has to limit his consumption-portfolio choice to policies that ensure the nonnegativity of his liquid wealth i.e. the value of his marketed assets at all times and with probability one. On the other hand, an unconstrained individual can run temporary de cits in his liquid wealth position as long as his total wealth is nonnegative. Here total wealth equals liquid wealth plus the current value of his endowment stream. We can then say that the constrained individual faces a liquidity constraint while the unconstrained individual faces a solvency constraint. For later purposes, we shall record a useful property of the liquid wealth process generated by an 
3 Optimal consumption-portfolio policies.
In this section we rst describe an equivalent static consumption choice problem for a constrained agent section 3.1. We then derive the optimal consumption policy section 3.2, discuss consumption behavior section 3.3, characterize the shadow price of the liquidity constraint section 3.4 and provide numerical computation of the solution that allows and further economic intuition regarding the agent's lifetime consumption pro le section 3.5. To simplify notation we omit superscripts i throughout the section.
Static optimization with a liquidity constraint.
It is well known that the dynamic consumption-portfolio problem of an unconstrained agent is related to a static problem involving consumption choice only A consequence of Theorem 4 is that we can focus on the conditions 20 to solve the static problem and identify the optimal consumption policy. This task is carried out in section 3.4. 4 Remark 1 The rst order conditions 20 also reveal that the optimal consumption of the constrained agent coincides with the consumption plan that he would choose in an arti cial shadow" economy without liquidity constraint, but in which the state price density is given by y , rather than . Since t is a nondecreasing process, this shadow" economy can be interpreted as the original economy but with a new riskfree return that experiences increases at selected times. In order to get the same consumption and wealth path in this arti cial unconstrained economy, the riskfree return has to increase just enough to discourage the agent to run uncovered short Note that these su cient conditions for existence are satis ed by power utility functions with a relative risk aversion di erent from one. The constructive derivation of the optimal policy that we carry out in section 3.4 does not require such restrictions on utility functions.
positions at times when he would otherwise like to do so. Note however, that this reinterpretation of the model might be misleading: as we show later the liquidity constraint will actually lower the equilibrium riskfree return relative to an economy without liquidity constraint.
Consumption behavior with a liquidity constraint.
As the previous example shows, a wealth constrained individual exhibits a consumption behavior which departs signi cantly from the standard unconstrained case. Let Iy;t = inffx 0 : u c x; t yg denote the left-inverse of the marginal utility of consumption. The rst order condition in 20 yields the optimal consumption policy c t = Iy , t t :
Risk aversion implies that the inverse marginal utility I is strictly decreasing. Since is a nondecreasing process, we conclude that the multiplier y which solves the static budget constraint E Z T 0 t Iy , t t , e t dt = nS 0 exceeds the multiplier which would prevail in the absence of a wealth constraint. As explained earlier, the process captures the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between two time periods and the ratio of the state-prices corresponding to these states. The former will be smaller than the latter since the agent cannot borrow. The fact that only increases at times when the constraint binds also means that the multiplier re ects the anticipation of occurrence of future constrained states. Since the process is null at zero, we also deduce that the agent reduces consumption in early age while increasing it at later stages in his life: early age corresponds to a period of bu er wealth buildup. The anticipation of future constrained states is the source of his conservative behavior at the outset. This optimal policy is radically di erent from the naive" intuition suggesting that the individual starts o his consumption policy at levels more or less equal to the ones in the unconstrained case, and then readjusts his consumption downward when bad times" occur in order to accumulate income, build up wealth and loosen the constraint.
Another striking di erence with the standard consumption behavior is the presence of a singular component in the evolution of the consumption function. Indeed, applying Ito's lemma to the optimal consumption process gives where R R = , cucc uc denotes the relative risk aversion coe cient and P = , cuccc ucc is the relative prudence coe cient. The volatility of consumption has the same structure as in the standard model. The drift coe cient, however, has the additional term R R ,1 y , t ,1 d t relative to the unconstrained case. This term re ects the impact of the wealth constraint. In states of nature in which the constraint is lax, we have d = 0 and the consumption growth rate has the standard local behavior in particular, the expected growth rate is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. But consumption does not grow at the same rate as in the unconstrained case since the consumption level anticipates future constrained states. Prior to reaching a constrained state the agent builds up his wealth by reducing consumption. Furthermore in those good states of nature in which the individual would like to deplete his wealth in order to improve his resources at other less favorable times, he can only do so to a limited extent since he cannot take aggregate short positions. Thus, each time the constraint binds, the agent has to readjust his consumption behavior upwards given his inability to cross-subsidize less favorable states. These intuitions will become clear below when we solve the consumption-portfolio problem in the tree example set up in the introduction. However, before proceeding to this example we rst study the solution of the control problem in detail: this will enable us to develop an algorithm to compute the multiplier and the optimal consumption-portfolio policy.
3.4 The shadow price of liquidity.
In order to compute the consumption policy and shed further light on consumption behavior we need to compute the multiplier . In this section, we provide a characterization of which facilitates its computation. The key to this characterization is the transformation of the forwardbackward structure of the original problem 20 into a purely backward structure. This is achieved by a c hange of variables. Note that the rst two conditions 23-24 in the auxiliary problem have a backward structure as opposed to the forward-backward structure of the original constrained problem. A closer look at the two problems also reveals that the process in the constrained problem is given by t = 0 ;t where solves the backward problem. The auxiliary problem 23-25 then computes the push" at date t assuming that the constraint did not bind prior to t. This formulation is of interest because it provides a useful and simple characterization of the Lagrange multiplier process. Lemma The solution of the consumption problem of a liquidity-constrained agent n o w follows. The characterization of the multiplier in Theorem 6 is relatively easy to implement n umerically. The main idea underlying the result is to start the problem anew at each point in time i.e. ignoring past occurrences of a binding constraint: this reduces the forward-backward equations satis ed by the multiplier in the rst-order conditions to a purely backward equation.
Given the optimal consumption policy in Theorem 6 and the results in Proposition 3 we obtain the following characterization of the optimal portfolio. On the event fX t = 0 g there is no investment in the stock: t = 0 .
A t times when the constraint binds liquid wealth must belocally nondecreasing in order to keep meeting the constraint. This can only be achieved if investment in the stock market is null: on the event fX t = 0 g the optimal portfolio is t = 0 .
T o shed further light on the nature of the solution to the constrained problem we next use the optimality conditions derived above to solve the example put forth in the introduction.
An example with liquidity constraints.
We n o w reconsider the example of Section 1.1, in the presence of a liquidity constraint. In order to solve the consumption-portfolio problem, we use the algorithm based on the backward procedure developed in section 3.4. Whenever the liquidity constraint binds the algorithm recomputes the multiplier at all successor nodes to ensure nonnegative liquid wealth. The next tree shows the evolution of the multiplier , optimal consumption c, end-of-period portfolio holdings ; B , and beginning of period liquid wealth X. The Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint i n the presence of liquidity constraints is 1:0932. Consider nodes u, uu and compare them with their equivalents in the unconstrained tree in Section 1.1. At these nodes, the agent experiences good news regarding the realization of his labor income relative t o t h e previous period. The unconstrained portfolio value is then negative because the agent tailors his portfolio so as to transfer funds out of these nodes towards southern nodes of the tree with relatively less favorable income realizations.
However, the constrained portfolio value is zero at these nodes: the agent cannot transfer as much w ealth from his high income realizations in nodes u; uu to the rest of the tree as he would like, i.e. he cannot borrow against his future labor income. A consequence is that consumption in the states u, uu has to increase relative to the unconstrained case, in which the individual can hedge without restrictions. We t h us have c u ; c uu = 1 : 5033; 2:5495 in the constrained case versus c u ; c uu = 1 : 3264; 1:4659 in the unconstrained case of Section 1.1.
Note that this extra consumption gulp" relative to the unconstrained case is due to the inability to hold an aggregate short position at u. This is a source of path dependency in optimal behavior note that the tree above is not recombining while the tree in the unconstrained case is recombining. The occurrence of a binding constraint at any of these nodes will permanently decrease the marginal valuation of wealth at follower nodes, in the sense that the individual will attempt to consume this extra consumption gulp" by smoothing it across follower nodes. Of course, the inability to transfer wealth out of states u and uu b y constructing a portfolio with a negative payo in those states implies that the investor is unable to compensate for his low endowment in states d; du; dd. Consumption at these nodes is therefore lower than in the unconstrained case. Furthermore, as noted above, path dependency arises in the consumption decision. For example, note that the portfolio value at du is zero. Since the investor is unable to transfer wealth out of u; ud, he tries to transfer wealth out of the next best node, which i s du, towards d; dd. To achieve this, the best he can do is to drive his wealth down to zero at the beginning of period three at node du, and consume his full endowment c du = e du = e ud = 1 : 16 there. Thus, due to the path dependency, the constraint binds at du even though wealth was strictly positive there in the unconstrained case. Finally, at time zero he consumes an amount which leaves him with zero nancial needs for future net consumption. This will be re ected in a larger multiplier value for the static budget constraint 3, namely 1:0932 versus 0:6545. This implies that even though the constraint never binds, the consumption and portfolio behavior in the constrained and unconstrained case will be di erent for example, compare the paths ! d ! dd in the constrained and unconstrained cases.
In summary, liquidity constraints segment the uncertainty tree into subtrees. The nodes at which the constraint binds and their successors are treated in isolation of the rest of the tree for consumption smoothing purposes. Transfers of wealth then take place among the remaining nodes of the tree, which form an independent system. In the example above, the nodes u; uu; ud form a closed subtree: wealth cannot be shifted from these good states toward bad states of nature. As a result, the wealth levels in the remaining nodes of the tree are lower in the constrained case than in the unconstrained case. This explains why the relative prices of consumption in di erent states will not be ex-ante equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption in these states. This provides a rationale to a potentially counterintuitive result: at times at which the liquid wealth of the consumer hits zero, he actually boosts his consumption level in a permanent fashion. Of i Consider an economy in which unconstrained c onsumption is an increasing function of relative risk aversion. In this context constrained c onsumption may be humped increasing-decreasing.
ii The constrained consumption function is homogeneous of degree one in initial endowment and wealth: ckX t ; k e t ; t = kcX t ; e t ; t :
Unconstrained consumption is increasing in relative risk aversion if the interest rate is sufciently large relative to the market price of risk. For the model with constant coe cients a necessary and su cient condition is r 1 2 , 1=R 2 . In the presence of a liquidity constraint consumption increases for low levels of risk aversion. Liquid wealth at future nodes is reduced and this eventually leads to a binding constraint. When the constraint binds at nodes that were previously unconstrained the subtrees issued from these nodes become segmented. Consumption smoothing then takes place over the remainder of the tree. The net result is that consumption eventually falls in order to allow reallocations over less favorable nodes of the remainder of the tree. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon.
The homogeneity property relative to total wealth follows from the homogeneity of the Lagrange multipliers with respect to multiplicative c hanges in endowments and liquid wealth. This result extends the standard property for the unconstrained policy. 4 Equilibrium.
In this section we show the existence of a competitive equilibrium section 4.1, provide a characterization in terms of an "aggregator" section 4.2, examine the equilibrium interest rate and the equity premium section 4.3 and provide numerical estimates for power utility function section 4.4.
Existence of equilibrium.
Consider the economy of section 2 with one unconstrained and one constrained agents agents 1 and 2, respectively. Let C = D + e denote aggregate consumption. We suppose that aggregate endowment e = e 1 + e 2 follows the Ito process de t = e t e t ds + e t dW t where e ; e are progressively measurable process. The aggregate consumption process C = D + e has drift c and volatility coe cient c given by To prove existence of equilibrium we need to solve the equations that describe market clearing and individual rationality, namely: The system 36-38 is similar in structure to the system of equations characterizing the optimal consumption policy in the static problem. As we show in the appendix, the same methodology can then be applied to prove the existence of a solution. This yields the existence of the competitive equilibrium and the following characterization.
Theorem 9 Consider the economy E of section 2. A competitive equilibrium c i ; i i 2 C U ; S; ; A; ; r exists. Theorem 9 is proved as a particular case of the N-agent equilibrium in Appendix C. Note that our construction provides the equilibrium state price density in terms of the inverse aggregate demand function and the shadow prices of the budget and liquidity constraints. In the next section, we show that equilibrium prices in our economy are fully characterized by the SPD t = gC t ; y , t where g is the inverse aggregate demand function de ned above and the multipliers y; uniquely solve 36-38. This might come as a surprise, since aggregation results are only known to hold in complete markets economies or economies with incomplete markets but restricted diversity among agents. We therefore elaborate on this point i n t h e next section. In further sections, we will detail the structure of other equilibrium quantities and prices that can be inferred from this SPD.
A representative agent characterization of equilibrium.
In economies with complete markets and diverse agents the second welfare theorem establishes the existence of a no-trade equilibrium with identical pricing kernel. One can use this construction to prove existence of equilibrium Neigishi 1960 or to characterize asset prices without demand aggregation Constantinides 1982. Here we use the construction to characterize asset prices. In independent w ork, Cuoco and He 1994 also applied a similar representative agent methodology in an incomplete market model situation though their source of incompleteness is di erent from ours.
A feasible allocation is a non-negative array of processes x i such that Proposition 10 Suppose that c i ; i i 2 C U ; S; ; A; ; r is an equilibrium for the economy E. Note that the previous result implies that, in equilibrium, the price of risk expected return per unit of volatility is bounded above and below by the largest and smallest coe cient of relative risk aversion of the individuals in the economy, respectively. If we understand that the much discussed equity premium puzzle" makes reference to an abnormally high expected stock return per unit of risk the Sharpe ratio rather than the level of the expected return 5 , the above aggregation result in Proposition 11 states that it is futile to attempt to explain the puzzle through liquidity constraints or incomplete markets in general: it is impossible to generate an aggregate risk aversion which is larger than the relative risk aversion of all individuals in the economy.
Interest rate and equity premium with liquidity constraints.
In order to describe the equilibrium interest rate and prices it is convenient to use the risk aversion coe cient R a and prudence coe cient P a of the representative agent constructed in the previous section. These are respectively given by The rationale for de ning the equity premium puzzle through the Sharpe ratio lies in the fact that, keeping other quantities constant, the level of expected return of its stock is a ected by the leverage assumed by the rm. where R i and P i represent the relative risk aversion and relative prudence coe cients of agent i.
Our next result details the structure of the competitive equilibrium. In equilibrium the riskless cumulative rate has two components. The rst is a locally riskless interest rate r which has the familiar structure 43. As usual r is positively related to the expected consumption growth rate and negatively related to aggregate consumption risk if the aggregator exhibits positive prudence. Unlike models with portfolio constraints or incomplete markets, the cumulative interest rate also has a singular component A; described in 44. This component is tied to the occurrence of a binding liquidity constraint. Whenever the constraint binds the consumption demand savings demand of the agent experiences a permanent predictable increase decrease. The cumulative interest rate naturally re ects the increased demand: its fall is just enough to provide an adequate incentive t o reduce consumption immediately. The extent of the decrease in cumulative interest rate is related to the size of the net multiplier y , . If the net multiplier is small, past consumption deferral has been substantial enough to ensure that the liquidity constraint is satis ed. If the liquidity constraint binds, the marginal value of wealth decreases and the additional consumption increase required to match this decrease becomes large since marginal utility is very low. The required decrease in the cumulative riskfree return becomes comparatively large. 6 The analysis above, thus, shows that liquidity constraints tend to reduce the cumulative riskless return relative to an unconstrained economy. The incorporation of these constraints may then help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle Weil 1990.
Since the interest rate re ects all the deterministic components in the growth rate of the marginal utility of the aggregator it is not surprising to realize that the risk premium of the stock 45 does not depend directly on the liquidity constraint. Indeed this risk premium has the usual structure: it satis es the consumption CAPM. Indirect e ects of the liquidity constraint, however, a ect the intertemporal properties of the equity premium because the risk aversion parameter of the aggregator is a composite of the risk aversions of all agents in the economy and therefore re ects the distribution of consumption across agents. Whenever the constraint binds the aggregator's weight reallocates consumption across agents and this generates singular components in the evolution of the equity premium. Does this mean that liquidity constraints can beinvoked to justify the empirical magnitude of the Sharpe ratio? The answer is negative. Indeed, the Sharpe ratio has an empirical magnitude of about :37 using Mehra and Prescott's 1985 numbers Since consumption growth's volatility is :0357 this implies an aggregator's risk aversion of 10:4 see 45. However, this number is unrealistic since the aggregator's risk aversion is bounded above b y the highest risk aversion of the agents populating the economy.
Examples
In this section we provide examples that can besolved in closed form and which illustrate the e ects of liquidity constraints described above. In the rst example, agents have homogeneous constant relative risk aversion parameter: the cumulative i n terest decreases while the Sharpe ratio is una ected. In the second example, relative risk aversions depend on the consumption levels and distributional e ects a ect equilibrium prices.
Example 1.
Consider a simple economy with 2 agents with homogeneous and constant relative risk aversion R. The aggregator's risk aversion and prudence coe cients are R a t = R and P a t = 1 + R: The 48 Under this condition the aggregator's risk aversion increases in the early stages of the liquidity constrained economy relative to an unconstrained economy. The equilibrium Sharpe ratio will be larger as well. Su cient conditions for 48 to hold are decreasing relative risk aversion of constrained agents, combined with increasing relative risk aversion of unconstrained agents and R 1 R 2 at the unconstrained allocation.
5 Liquidity constraints and incomplete markets.
In this section we outline an extension of our results to incomplete markets. In this environment liquidity constraints combine with the failure of full insurance to determine equilibrium prices and the consumption allocation.
We suppose that the uncertainty is represented by the 2-dimensional Wiener process W = volatility structure 1 ; 2 of the stock price: the class of price processes 54 is su ciently large to accommodate an instantaneous impact of both Brownian motion processes on the stock price.
Since markets are incomplete agents have individual valuations of the risks a ecting the economy. Assuming that 1 The only di erence with the earlier formulation is the addition of the incompleteness constraint last equation to the set of relevant conditions.
Our next veri cation theorem shows that the conditions 58 are su cient for the static optimization problem. 70 This system of equations is in part similar to the system of equations characterizing the complete markets' equilibrium. The impact of incompleteness is embedded in the last two constraints which require that the liquid wealth processes of agents lie in the asset span. For the multiagent economy with incomplete market and liquidity constraint equilibrium has the following structure. Theorem The structure of equilibrium re ects the di erent frictions in the economy. The interest rate is directly a ected by the liquidity constraint as in the earlier model with complete market. In addition incompleteness plays a role: the level of the interest rate and the response to shifts in aggregate consumption growth rate and volatility depend on the individual prices of W 2 -risk.
The risk premium of the stock displays structural properties which are similar to the case of complete markets since it satis es the consumption CAPM: in view of 71, only covariance with aggregate consumption commands a premium. The liquidity constraint again has an indirect e ect on the size of the premium through the risk aversion of the aggregator and the distribution of consumption in the economy. Note that incompleteness has no e ect on the structure of the consumption CAPM since the distribution of marginal utilities across agents, which represents the second factor in this economy, is orthogonal to the stock's returns.
Note also that incompleteness cannot rationalize the empirical size of the Sharpe ratio either: the aggregator's risk aversion is the same harmonic average of the agents risk aversions as in the case of liquidity constraints alone. Since W 1 and W 2 risks are uncorrelated, it is easy to see from 71 that the Sharpe ratio of the market is bounded above by R a t c t , which is the Sharpe ratio corresponding to the same economy but with complete markets. This indicates that an aggregate risk aversion of 10:4 can not be plausibly supported in this model.
Our last result specializes the model to homogeneous constant relative risk aversion. Both the incomplete market restriction and the liquidity constraint reduce the interest rate relative to the complete market case.
Two additional features of the competitive equilibrium are noteworthy in the case under consideration. First note that both the incomplete market and the liquidity constraint tend to reduce the interest rate relative to the frictionless case. Incompleteness has a negative impact since marginal utilities and the distribution of consumption across agents become unambiguously more volatile when relative risk aversion is constant and homogeneous. This reinforces the case for an explanation of the riskfree puzzle based on incomplete markets and liquidity constraints.
The second feature of equilibrium is the fact that the Sharpe ratio does not increase because of market incompleteness or liquidity constraints. Since the CCAPM holds and due to the orthogonality b e t w een dW 1 and dW 2 risks in 54, it is easy to see from the third equation in Corollary 16 that when markets are incomplete, the Sharpe ratio is bounded above b y the Sharpe ratio that would otherwise hold if markets were complete and the agent faced no liquidity constraint.
In summary, our results indicate there is no hope for explanations of the equity premium puzzle based on incomplete markets or liquidity constraints as de ned in this paper. This poses a problem for the literature that seeks to resolve this puzzle on the basis of ad-hoc portfolio constraints. Our point is that once these portfolio constraints are endogenized and made e ectively wealth-dependent, the asset-pricing implications regarding risk premia change radically. 6 Conclusions.
In this paper we presented a general equilibrium analysis of an exchange economy in which some agents cannot market their income. We h a v e shown that a liquidity constraint restricts the consumption allocation of an individual over the lifecycle. Constrained individuals will optimally defer consumption to the future in order to insure against liquidity shortages. At times when the constraint binds their consumption experiences permanent increases. The individual consumption behavior a ects the structure of prices and the interest rate at equilibrium. Our analysis demonstrates that short term rates have a tendency to decrease in the presence of a liquidity constraint. Liquidity constraints may then help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle. However, the valuation of risk does not seem to change much since the equilibrium price of risk is a positive and convex combination of the relative risk aversion coe cients of the agents in the economy. In any case neither market incompleteness nor liquidity constraints can beinvoked to explain the empirical magnitude of the Sharpe ratio. In further work we will seek to investigate analytically and numerically the impact of liquidity constraints on the volatility of asset prices and on the average level of the equity premium.
The paper also includes several methodological contributions. The rst of these is a new approach to the consumption problem in the presence of a liquidity constraint which leads to an explicit solution for the consumption policy and which lends itself to numerical implementation. The second contribution is a constructive approach to the determination of equilibrium in economies with liquidity constraints. The third methodological contribution is the design of a computational algorithm which enables us to handle the type of path-dependent problems that arise in the presence of liquidity constraints. The fourth methodological contribution consists of a local aggregation method, essentially di erent from Rubinstein 1974, that enables us to characterize the pricing kernel as the marginal utility of a representative agent in an incomplete markets economy. We foresee several other areas of applications of these methods, including macroeconomic and international asset pricing models involving barriers and constraints, and models incorporating default risk. is identical to the problem that we solved before. As long as the integrand h t x has the right properties we can apply the construction in Lemma 5 and Theorem 6. Since the function h t y , t;s is strictly increasing with respect to t for t su ciently large, we can always nd t y such that F t y; t y 0: Hence the same construction as in the case of exogenous state price density w orks. The same arguments also lead to the multiplier y which satis es the static budget constraint 25 of the constrained agent in equilibrium.
Proof Proof of Theorem 12: To simplify notation we assume that the unconstrained agent has a liquidity constraint multiplier 1 Substituting the Sharpe ratio formula in this expression produces the result in the lemma. we obtain from the goodsmarket clearing condition 89 t = u c e t ; y , t g t y , t where g t :
N N j=2 0; y j ! R + is the unique solution of e t = P j2U I j y j g t y , t + P Proof of Lemma 22: Properties ii, iii and iv are straightforward. To prove i note that 89 and property ii of lemma 21 imply I j x j g t x , e j t 0 for x j su ciently low. Let x j be such that I j x j g t x , e j t = 0 : Property iv of Lemma 21 implies g t x + x j @g t x @x j = I 0 1 g t x + P i6 =1;j I 0 i x i g t xx i g t x I 0 1 g t x + P i6 =1 I 0 i x i g t xx i 0:
Hence I j x j g t x , e j t is decreasing and for x j x j we have I j x j g t x , e j t 0: Since @g t x =@x j 0 it then follows from iv that @h j t x =@x j 0 for x j x j : Consider now the N c -dimensional vector process We consider now a simple binomial model with underlying underlying uncertainty process z and parameters u and d, and probability p. p zu z & 1,p zd The initial value is z 0 and the tree has N steps. Agents endowments are functionals of the trajectories of the random walk z. Since prices and the interest rate are endogenous the risk neutral probability is given by some measure q f q n : n = 1 ; :::; Ng and the interest rate by some process r. The state price density satis es r n n+1 = n q n =p 1 , q n =1 , p : In these equations h ,1 n x is the largest value of the argument o f h n that reaches the level x:
It is easy to verify that the process can be recovered from the solution of the backward equation as n = max n ; :::; 1 : Our next lemma establishes the existence of the process :
Lemma 27 The backward equation 107-108 has a unique solution n y. Proof of Lemma 27: Suppose that h n y + A n y;0 0: Then the recursive equation n = y ,h ,1 n ,A n y; n is equivalent t o h n y , n + A n n = 0 : As in appendix A it can be veri ed that the left hand side of this equation is strictly increasing with respect to n for y, n su ciently small and that it converges to in nity a s y , n goes to zero. The result follows by continuity.
The process is then given by n y = max n y; :::; 1 y;where y denotes the solution for a given constant y:We h a v e Lemma 28 The map y has the following properties i y is a nondecreasing function of y, Using the liquid wealth process and de ning V j n = g n y , n y ,1 E n P N i=n g i y , i ye j i we can now write r n X j n + j n u n , r n , c j n + e j n + r n V j n + 1 , q n V ju n +1 , V jd n +1 , e j n 
